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LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM
POPULIST BACKLASH

AND

THE

Eric A. Posner*
ABSTRACT
A populist backlash around the world has targeted international law and
legal institutions. Populists see international law as a device used by global
elites to dominate policymaking and benefit themselves at the expense of the
common people. This turn of events exposes the hollowness at the core of
mainstream international law scholarship, for which the expansion of
international law and the erosion of sovereignty have always been a forgone
conclusion. But international law is dependent on public trust in technocratic
rule-by-elites, which has been called into question by a series of international
crises.
INTRODUCTION
An upswing in populist sentiment around the world poses the greatest
threat to liberal international legal institutions since the Cold War.1 In Russia,
Vladimir Putin has drawn on Russian nationalism to consolidate his control,
allowing him to engage in violent foreign adventures in Georgia, Ukraine,
and Syria. The European Union has been shaken by a debt crisis and a
migration crisis, which have accelerated trends toward disintegration. In
* Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law School.
Thanks to Adam Chilton, Jack Goldsmith, Andrew Woods, and conference participants for
comments. I also received helpful comments from audiences at presentations at the Free
University of Berlin and Humboldt University; special thanks to Heike Krieger, who provided
valuable commentary at the Humboldt University meeting. Thanks also to Christina McClintock
for research assistance and the Russell Baker Scholars Fund for financial support.
1.
On recent trends in populism, see Pippa Norris, It’s Not Just Trump. Authoritarian
Populism Is Rising Across the West. Here’s Why., WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/11/its-not-just-trumpauthoritarian-populism-is-rising-across-the-west-heres-why/?utm_term=.b5d66ce1779c. And for
a compendium of useful recent articles on the spread of populism around the world, see E.J. Graff,
Everything You Need to Know About the Worldwide Rise of Populism, WASH. POST (Nov. 10,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/10/heres-what-weknow-about-the-spread-of-populism-worldwide/?utm_term=.c2c866a6a4b2.
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Hungary and Poland, nationalist governments with authoritarian aspirations
have come to power. In other European countries, including Netherlands,
France, and Germany, nationalist political parties have achieved high levels
of popularity and political influence, while British voters have voted to exit
the European Union. In Turkey, the government has launched a ferocious
crackdown on the press and the political opposition. In the United States,
Donald Trump has criticized numerous international organizations, including
NATO, NAFTA, and the United Nations, and withdrawn the United States
from the Paris climate agreement. His election reflects increasing isolationist
sentiment among Americans. Trump, like populists in Europe and elsewhere,
has criticized international institutions and norms, and seems likely to
repudiate certain international norms and possibly treaties in the areas of
trade, security, and the laws of war.2 In the Philippines, populist President
Rodrigo Duterte has embarked on a scheme of extrajudicial killings in order
to combat crime and consolidate his power. In India, Prime Minister
Narendra Modi preaches Hindu nationalism at the expense of the country’s
vast Muslim minority.
Specific causes and circumstances vary across countries but the common
theme is a challenge to the “establishment” or “elites” by outsiders on behalf
of the common people or, in some cases, by insiders who claim a mandate
from the common people. This is what I mean by “populism.”3 The
establishment is portrayed as some combination of the following institutions
and individuals: the traditional parties and their leadership; the government
bureaucracy; business and labor leaders; and international bodies and their
memberships. The populist leader argues that the establishment is “corrupt,”
meaning that it either enriches itself at the expense of the people, or shows
greater concern for foreigners or minorities than for the common citizen. In
the most virulent cases, where populism verges on authoritarianism, the
populist leader rejects democratic pluralism, claiming the mandate of the
nation and denying that a legitimate political opposition exists.
Populism poses a threat to international law and order for two reasons.
First, international law is rule by technocracy. It relies on trust and mutual
goodwill, while populists see corruption and advantage-taking all around
2.
He has already withdrawn the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPO),
and he seems intent on weakening the World Trade Organization (WTO). See Shawn Donnan &
Demetri Sevastopulo, Trump Team Looks to Bypass WTO Dispute System, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 26,
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/7bb991e4-fc38-11e6-96f8-3700c5664d30.
3.
For valuable recent accounts, see JOHN B. JUDIS, THE POPULIST EXPLOSION: HOW THE
GREAT RECESSION TRANSFORMED AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN POLITICS 1–4 (2016); JAN-WERNER
MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 1–7 (2016).
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them, and direct their ire at the experts. We see this in the rhetoric of
populists, who frequently blame foreign influences and international
institutions for the nation’s problems.4 In recent years, populists have targeted
the European institutions, the International Monetary Fund, and the
International Criminal Court, and they have mocked and belittled
international legal norms, including human rights law and the laws of war,
and the quasi-legal principle of humanitarian intervention.
Second, international law is inherently pluralist. It assumes that different
countries have legitimate national interests, and seeks to promote
cooperation, accommodation, and reconciliation. Because populism usually
rejects pluralism, the populist mind has difficulty recognizing that the
interests of foreign nations are legitimate, or that there is any inherent virtue
to an international order that respects differences among nations. Foreign
countries are more likely seen as rivals or enemies, and the international order
as a series of contingent deals rather than a supranational system of law.
It is impossible to predict whether the populist reaction will demolish the
current international order, erode it, or flame out without causing any damage
to international institutions. It is also possible that institutions will be
strengthened and improved as a result of this trial by fire. The purpose of this
paper is not to make predictions but to investigate causes, focusing on the
failures of international law. I argue that the international law community has
seriously misunderstood the evolution of international law, with the result
that it is unprepared to comment on the populist backlash. Specifically, I
argue that a common view held by these elites—that further international
legal integration of the world is inevitable and beneficial, and that it enjoys
the support of most ordinary people—has been refuted by events. Moreover,
the populist reaction to international law may be traced to two essential
features of international law—that it is technocratic and has been advanced
by the establishment. Even if international law recovers, these features will
remain a source of vulnerability.
In Part I, I discuss the dominant thinking in international law—what I have
called elsewhere “global legalism.”5 In Part II, I show how this thinking both
disregarded contradictory evidence long before the populist backlash, and
cannot make sense of the backlash. In Part III, I discuss possible explanations
for the recent turn of events, focusing on the relationship between populist
thinking and international law.
4.
András Derzsi-Horváth, Western Populism Is a Fundamental Threat to the
Humanitarian System, GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment-professionals-network/2016/nov/26/western-populism-is-a-fundamental-threat-tothe-humanitarian-system.
5.
ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 2 (2009).
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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMUNITY

The international law community has been noticeably unprepared for the
populist reaction. It has sat on the sidelines, largely mute, as events have
unfolded.6 In the view of global legalists, globalization is inevitable, and
globalization requires ever greater international cooperation. In the words of
Peter Spiro,
Massive material changes in the nature of global interaction—
captured under the necessarily capacious umbrella of
“globalization”—will inevitably overwhelm sovereigntist defenses,
which, notwithstanding their constitutional pedigree and apparent
gravity, are in the end incapable of stemming the tide.7

International cooperation takes places through law, and as international law
expands, traditional notions of state sovereignty must contract. The process
involves the proliferation of treaties; the expansion of customary
international law and other free-floating legal norms, including human rights
norms, that bind states without their consent; and the creation of international
organizations, above all courts and monitoring bodies. International law
strengthens its grip on states by infiltrating domestic institutions, including
domestic courts, which increasingly defer to international norms, and even
capturing the imagination of government officials and ordinary people, who
believe that international law supersedes domestic law.
To understand the radical albeit unquestioned nature of this vision, we can
contrast it with the traditional, “Westphalian” view of international law.
According to the Westphalian view, states are sovereign, which means that
they are legally entitled to noninterference by other states. 8 They can make
binding legal commitments by voluntarily entering into treaties with other
states, or by submitting to customary international law, which was also
considered a voluntary process—where implicit consent through nonobjection substitutes for explicit consent required for treaties. Even when
states enter into treaties, however, their sovereignty remains intact. Domestic
courts and other institutions are required to comply with treaty norms only if
the government voluntarily promulgates the treaty as domestic law. If it does

6.
There are, of course, some exceptions. For a valuable discussion, see generally Heike
Krieger & Georg Nolte, The International Rule of Law—Rise of Decline?: Points of Departure
(KFG
Working
Paper
Series,
No.
1,
2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2866940.
7.
Peter J. Spiro, Sovereigntism’s Twilight, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 307, 307 (2013); see
also id. at 315 (“unstoppable international law”).
8.
Stephane Beaulac, The Westphalian Model in Defining International Law: Challenging
the Myth, 8 AUSTL. J. LEGAL HIST. 181, 183 (2004).
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not, and if a state violates international law, then other states may resort to
self-help.
The Westphalian view came under pressure from various directions. The
Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, and other twentieth-century atrocities
cast doubt on the moral and political sustainability of the non-interference
principle. When a government massacres its citizens in large numbers,
foreign countries may have little choice but to intervene—under pressure
from their own citizens or because they fear that chaos in one country will
spread across borders. Early efforts to embody this view in international law
eventually led to an elaborate human rights legal regime consisting of treaties
and a vast infrastructure of international organizations.9 The catastrophic
humanitarian devastation of the two world wars also gave rise to a demand
for a supra-national institution that could block countries from going to war.
The League of Nations, followed by the United Nations, resulted. With the
start of the Cold War, the United States encouraged international cooperation
in the West by establishing trade and investment institutions, and supporting
European integration. At the end of the Cold War, a brief but powerful sense
that the historical trajectory must end with an international confederation of
liberal democracies led to enthusiastic support for universal international
institutions that supported trade, democracy, peace, and human rights,
demonstrated most powerfully by a greatly expanded commitment among
Europeans to legal and institutional integration.
International law scholars cheered these developments, and provided the
legal arguments for them. But they faced a conceptual hurdle: traditional
international law thinking heavily depended on the Westphalian notion of
sovereign states who adjust their legal relations only through consent. On this
view, human rights was a choice like any other; a state could refuse to ratify
human rights treaties and could withdraw from them as long as it satisfied
customary notice requirements.10 Similarly, states could refuse to join
international security bodies (as in the case of the United States and the
League of Nations) or withdraw from them (the case of Germany and Japan
during the interwar period). They could withdraw from or disregard the
opinions of international judicial bodies. Such an international order could
hardly be very robust.
International law scholars addressed this problem in two ways—one legal
and one sociological. First, an early generation of lawyers exploited a
9.
See ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1–7 (2014), for a
discussion of early international human rights regimes. SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA:
HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 1–11 (2012), provides a useful history.
10. See POSNER, supra note 9, at 14.
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vulnerability in Westphalian legal doctrine, which was the ambiguous nature
of consent.11 Governments had long recognized customary international law,
which in theory (and according to legal doctrine) rested on consent but in
practice reflected decisions made by governments long ago and not the
consent of modern governments in any meaningful sense. Norms of
customary international law often could be ginned up from scattered official
statements and practices that expressed consent only in the most ambiguous
terms. With such an elastic notion of consent already in place, lawyers could
argue that countries had implicitly consented to human rights norms (by
failing to openly defy them), and that they could be forbidden to withdraw
from organizations and treaties once they had consented to join them. The
high-water mark was the view that human rights norms had become
“constitutionalized” as a result of governments’ supposed recognition that
they would be bound by them for all eternity.12 Constitutionalized human
rights norms would take precedence over other inconsistent provisions
embodied in treaties that states subsequently negotiated.13
Second, some international law scholars, influenced by academic theory
and empirical methods from other disciplines, have argued that international
law rests on the consent (or, more precisely, the views or preferences) of
ordinary people and government officials.14 Citizens “internalize”
international law and, using their influence as voters or officeholders, demand
that their state follow international law, regardless of whether the government
consents to it in the formal sense required by Westphalian doctrine. Consent
remains a linchpin of international law but is moved from the level of
government to the level of citizen.
11. John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97
AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 782–83 (2003).
12. See, e.g., JAN KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS & GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1–3 (2009). See generally RULING THE
WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L.
Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009) [hereinafter RULING THE WORLD?]; Mattias Kumm, The
Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship Between Constitutionalism in and
Beyond the States, in RULING THE WORLD?, supra, at 258; Andreas L. Paulus, The International
Legal System as a Constitution, in RULING THE WORLD?, supra, at 69.
13. As Bradley and Gulati have pointed out, the longstanding view that countries cannot
withdraw from customary international law also seems to have been an invention of scholars
rather than an accurate depiction of state practice. See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati,
Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 204–08 (2010).
14. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1764–65 (2003). In U.S. scholarship, Harold Koh may be the most
prominent advocate of this position. Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106
YALE L.J. 2599, 2602–03 (1997). For a recent restatement, see MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE
POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1–17 (2008).
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Many legalist scholars realized that this view was in tension with the
Westphalian notion of state sovereignty, but predicted for just that reason that
Westphalian sovereignty would erode, or claimed that it had already eroded
beyond recognition.15 Nations were reconceptualized as institutions that
instrumentally created global public goods and advanced global values on
behalf of global citizens rather than as embodiments of a particular national
spirit. This idea merged with the main currents of academic ethics, which
supported cosmopolitanism—the view that people’s loyalty should be to
humanity as such rather than any particular tribal or national group—rather
than nationalism, which was dismissed as primitive and morally
indefensible.16
A boost to this view was provided by European integration. For many
years after the Treaty of Paris of 1951, academics understood European law
as a type of treaty law based on the consent of states. Over time, a new view
took hold: European law was understood to be a type of supranational law
with deeper binding force. The most famous articulation of this view was
advanced in a paper in 1991 by Joseph Weiler entitled The Transformation
of Europe.17 Weiler argued that political and economic integration had made
“exit”—the withdrawal of any member state from the EU (as it was about to
be called)—an impossibility, forcing member states to rely more on “voice,”
that is, the institutional structures set up within that system, which were
supervised and enforced by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).18 The result
was a transformation of Westphalian international law into a type of quasiconstitutional law. With the newly dominant role of the ECJ, rule-of-law
values would, at least at the margin, displace power politics.
Weiler’s academic view tracked the views of political elites in Europe and
shaped academic scholarship on European law. It also, as Weiler himself
advocated, provided a “model” for thinking about international law generally:
Both in its structure and process, and, in part, its ethos, the
Community has been more than a simple successful venture in
transnational cooperation and economic integration. It has been a
unique model for reshaping transnational discourse among states,
peoples, and individuals who barely a generation ago emerged from
15. See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 7, at 307–08. For a major statement from the prior generation,
see generally Louis Henkin, That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights,
Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1999).
16. See, e.g., PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION 4–5 (2002).
17. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991). For a recent
version of this argument, see Neil Walker, Reframing EU Constitutionalism, in RULING THE
WORLD?, supra note 12, at 149.
18. Weiler, supra note 17, at 2423.
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the nadir of Western civilization. It is a model with acute relevance
for other regions of the world with bleak histories or an even bleaker
present.19

The European “model” would play a role in justifying transnational legal
orders, as scholars argued that the type of political and psychological
transformation that took place in Europe could be, or actually had been,
reproduced globally.20
Meanwhile, in the United States a parallel development seemed to
reinforce the instincts of international law scholars. In domestic law, courts
had become increasingly open to legal arguments grounded in foreign or
international law. For American legal academics, judges are infinitely higherstatus than mere politicians. Judges can strike down statutes or interpret them
narrowly, and create law through the common-law process. The stubborn
provincialism of American lawmakers even at the height of globalization
mattered little if judges frog-marched them along the path laid out by
international law. An academic subculture developed to show that judges—
by instinct and inclination, and as a result of their gluttony for boondoggles
in foreign locations where they came under the influence of judges from other
countries—were advancing international law even if they did not know it.21
Exhibit A in the U.S. was the Supreme Court’s citation to foreign and
international law while defining the meaning of “cruel and unusual” in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.22 But the real excitement took place outside the
glare of the footlights. Scholars argued that courts implicitly and sometimes
explicitly incorporated international law into domestic law in subtle but farreaching ways: by interpreting ambiguous statutes in light of international
law; by drawing on international law to invent new common-law norms; by
respecting foreign judgments and enforcing foreign law; by giving priority to
treaties over inconsistent domestic law; and much else.23 And this pattern
extended far beyond the borders of the United States. Many foreign countries
incorporated international law into domestic law, at least presumptively, and
statutes based on universal jurisdiction proliferated throughout the world.
These statutes authorized governments to prosecute foreigners for human
19. Weiler, supra note 17, at 2483.
20. See Spiro, supra note 7, at 322; Weiler, supra note 17, at 2483.
21. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004), is the most influential
statement of this view. Justice Breyer implicitly accepts it, or a perhaps watered down version of
it, in a recent book. See STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND
THE NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 3–4 (2015).
22. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–79 (2005).
23. Koh, supra note 14, at 2656–57. For a sober evaluation of the law, see CURTIS A.
BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM (2015).
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rights violations regardless of the location of a violation and the nationalities
of the victims and perpetrators.24 With international law flowing through so
many cracks in the wall of sovereignty, it made little sense to think that walls
between nations really existed, whatever jingoist senators from rural areas in
the United States might say.
II.

WHAT WENT WRONG?
A. Domestic Law

The story begins in 1997, when Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith
published an article contesting the claim, incorporated by legalists into the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, that international customary
law is automatically incorporated into U.S. federal common law.25 Many
international law scholars reacted with fury26 but, as Bradley and Goldsmith
showed, there was never much evidence for the legalist view in the first
place.27
Indeed, it turned out that there was not much evidence for any of the claims
made by international law scholars. True, courts enforced foreign judgments
and occasionally interpreted statutes so as to avoid violating international
law, but they had always done that—this was nothing new. Moreover, these
were marginal doctrines, of little real-world significance. When the Bush
administration engaged in counterterrorism operations of questionable
validity from the standpoint of international law, the courts eventually pushed
back, but only a little, and based on constitutional and statutory law, not
international law.28 They were silent on Obama’s drone assassinations.
International law scholars also invested their energies in promoting the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS), an obscure 1789 law that a U.S. court of appeals
24. See AMNESTY INT’L, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF
LEGISLATION
AROUND
THE
WORLD—2012
UPDATE,
at
1
(2012),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior53/019/2012/en/.
25. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 817–20 (1997).
26. See Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV.
1824, 1850 (1998) (calling Bradley and Goldsmith’s view “bizarre”); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense
and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997).
27. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 852.
28. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 567 (2006). While Hamdan involved an interpretation of international law, the source
of law was statutory.
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revived in the case of Filártiga v. Peña-Irala in 1980, when it held that the
law provided a private cause of action for victims of human rights violations
anywhere in the world, regardless of the nationality of the victim or
perpetrator.29 Previously, human rights violations had never been the subject
of private litigation in U.S. (or any country’s) courts, except when they
overlapped with wrongful acts under ordinary domestic law, and sufficient
contacts between victims, perpetrators, and the United States existed.
International law scholars expected that this statute would help bring human
rights violators, and their corporate abettors, to their knees. Harold Koh called
Filártiga the “Brown v. Board of Education” of transnational litigation, his
term for human rights litigation.30 But the Supreme Court later cut back on it,
fearing that judicial knight-errants would cause frictions with foreign nations
and interfere with U.S. foreign policy, which rarely paid much attention to
the human rights records of its allies.31
Another example concerns the status of decisions of the International
Court of Justice (IJC) in domestic law. International law scholars had argued
that the decisions of international tribunals like the ICJ were binding in
domestic litigation.32 But in a pair of cases, the Supreme Court held that ICJ
holdings are not incorporated into domestic law, and that the president does
not possess the authority to enforce them where he does not already have that
power under domestic law.33 These cases make it difficult for the United
States to commit itself through domestic law to the rulings of international
organizations.
Observers might have understood that international law scholars’
interpretations of judicial practice were wildly at variance with popular
opinion, and for that reason were not sustainable even if some judges were
sympathetic to them. The Supreme Court’s foreign-law opinions offended
Americans who did not understand why foreign and international law should
play a role in constitutional interpretation. Members of Congress and state
legislators objected in the strongest terms to the notion that constitutional

29. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1980).
30. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366
(1991).
31. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013); Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 727–28 (2004). This was acknowledged even by Justice Breyer, a strong
supporter of the ATS and the cosmopolitan spirit that the modern literature on the ATS embodies.
See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
32. See Koh, supra note 30, at 2368–69.
33. Medellın
́ v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 516–17 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S.
331, 354–55 (2006).
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interpretation should be influenced by trends in foreign countries. 34 The
Court, for the time being, seems to have taken heed. While it has not
abandoned its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, it has lost its enthusiasm for
the general enterprise, mostly ignoring arguments grounded in foreign and
international law in cases involving other parts of the Constitution, even
while comparative-law professors furiously produce amicus briefs for the
uninterested Court.35
The populist revival in the United States seems far removed from these
obscure legal developments. It is quite unlikely that Roper or the early ATS
decisions helped Bernie Sanders or Donald Trump. And, indeed, the courts
had rejected most of the claims of international law scholars long before the
2016 election. But there is a lesson. Trump conducted his election campaign
as a populist, and attacked many of the accomplishments of liberal
internationalism—including the United Nations, the trade system, the web of
military alliances, the climate treaty, and the principle of humanitarian
intervention. In promising to torture terrorists, ban Muslims, and use other
harsh measures to protect American security, he repudiated the human rights
treaties and the laws of war. Although Trump has not—as far as I know—
repeated traditional objections to the ICC, human rights treaties, and the like,
it is hard to imagine that he will support them.36 Documents leaked from the
White House suggest that he or his subordinates are anxious to weaken
treaties and international organizations of all types.37 The strength of antiglobalist sentiment, which took elites by surprise, and showed how out of
touch they were with public opinion, also shows that the basic premise of
some international law scholars—that people internalize international law—
is questionable, to say the least.38 Nationalism is as strong as ever.
34. This is just the latest iteration, going back to the Bricker Amendment. Judith Resnik,
Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports
of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1608–10 (2006).
35. See Scott L. Cummings, The Internationalization of Public Interest Law, 57 DUKE L.J.
891, 1034–36 (2008).
36. These views are held by at least one Trump administration official, see generally
Michael Anton, America and the Liberal International Order, AM. AFF., Spring 2017, at 113.
37. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Trump’s Onslaught on International Law, LAWFARE (Mar. 17,
2017, 10:09 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-onslaught-international-law-andinstitutions.
38. See Public Sees U.S. Power Declining as Support for Global Engagement Slips:
America’s Place in the World 2013, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.peoplepress.org/2013/12/03/public-sees-u-s-power-declining-as-support-for-global-engagement-slips/
(finding that “support for U.S. global engagement, already near a historic low, has fallen further”).
Most Americans appear to support the use of torture, which is forbidden by international law. See
Richard Wike, Global Opinion Varies Widely on Use of Torture Against Suspected Terrorists,
PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/09/global-opinion-
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International law is seen as instrumental, not as an end in itself. Courts defy
these fundamental elements of political psychology at their peril.
B. European Law
The European system was always hampered by the absence of strong
democratic bona fides, known as the “democratic deficit” in the literature.39
European integration began as a series of treaties negotiated by the executives
of the European countries and approved by their governments. To an extent
that is unusual in international law, the treaties set up quasi-autonomous
international institutions, including a court (the European Court of Justice), a
bureaucracy (the European Commission), and a governing council (the
European Council). As the European system gained members and swallowed
up larger areas of policy, these institutions became extremely powerful. They
were, of course, entirely dominated by elites—highly educated, multilingual,
cosmopolitan. Ordinary voters exercised influence mainly through the
election of national leaders, who guided the European institutions or
appointed officeholders. Voters gave little attention to the day-to-day politics
of Europe, which mostly occurred behind closed doors.
To address the democratic deficit, European governments tried two major
approaches. First, they created a European Parliament composed of
representatives directly elected by the populations of the member states. The
Parliament was given numerous legislative powers although not the power to
initiate legislation. Second, they tried from time to time to obtain a popular
mandate for the European Union by holding popular referenda to approve
treaties, including a treaty signed in 2004 that would have created a European
constitution.
But neither approach succeeded. The Parliament was not taken seriously
by European voters, who seemed to be aware that its power was mainly
symbolic. The constitutional treaty was rejected by the French and Dutch. Its
supporters hastily reconfigured it as the Treaty of Lisbon. Under the law of
all the member states except Ireland, popular referenda were not necessary to
ratify the treaty. In Ireland, voters initially rejected the treaty, then approved

use-of-torture/. For a nice demonstration of the fragility of public support for international law,
see Stephen Chaudoin & Terrance Chapman, Contingent Public Support for International Legal
Institutions
(Mar.
21,
2017)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://www.stephenchaudoin.com/CC_Kstan.pdf.
39. See generally FRITZ SCHARPF, CRISIS AND CHOICE IN EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
(Ruth Crowley & Fred Thompson trans., 1991).
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it after further revisions. The weakness of democratic support for European
institutions was highlighted rather than cured.40
The best evidence for the political weakness of the European system is
survey data, which suggest that the effort to politically integrate never gained
traction.41 An important pattern, to which we will return, is that less educated
people have been less likely to identify as European or partially European,
than more educated people, supporting the common view that European
integration is, and has always been, a project of the elites.
In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Cameron called for a referendum
on whether Britain would remain in the EU. While a supporter of EU
membership, he believed the referendum necessary to fight off challenges
from within his party and UKIP, an independent party committed to exit. In
2016, voters approved the “leave” position by a slight margin. Meanwhile,
significant populist movements in France, the Netherlands, Denmark, and
even Germany reflect, to varying degrees, unhappiness with European
institutions and a longing for a return to the era of national sovereignty. The
European experiment is now in doubt.
What accounts for the crisis of the European system? The democratic
deficit is not a sufficient explanation: the deficit has been a feature of the
European system from the beginning. In the United Kingdom, longstanding
worries that the UK and the continent were culturally and politically
incompatible—as well as complaints that European bureaucrats dictated the
size of cucumbers and that the ECJ struck down British penal and
counterterrorism policies—were never sufficient to motivate departure
though they did provide the basis for the Euroscepticism that eventually
blossomed into the Leave campaign.42
The real failures were the euro crisis, which began in 2008, and the
migration crisis of 2016. While the United Kingdom was not a member of the
currency union, the euro crisis shook confidence in European institutions.43
The currency union was premised on greater political, economic, cultural,
40. See
generally
Q&A:
The
Lisbon
Treaty,
BBC
News,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6901353.stm (last updated Jan. 17, 2011, 10:42 GMT);
Introduction, LISBON TREATY, http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty.html (last
visited June 24, 2017).
41. For early work, see Robert Rohrschneider, The Democracy Deficit and Mass Support
for an EU-Wide Government, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 463, 472 (2002).
42. See generally BENJAMIN GROB-FITZGIBBON, CONTINENTAL DRIFT: BRITAIN AND
EUROPE FROM THE END OF EMPIRE TO THE RISE OF EUROSCEPTICISM (2016).
43. Jeffry Frieden, The Crisis, the Public, and the Future of European Integration 4–5, 17–
19 (June 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard University),
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jfrieden/files/frieden_conf_june2015.pdf.
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and regulatory integration than has ever existed. When the American
financial crisis spread to Europe, it sparked banking and sovereign debt crises
in the periphery, which in turn ignited a political crisis because governments
could not agree on how the financial and economic burdens should be shared
across Europe. In the end, the German government, the European Central
Bank, officials of the European Union, and the IMF forced austerity on the
periphery countries in return for rescue loans and bailouts. The common
currency was an elite-led policy from the start; the failure to manage the crisis
was a failure of the elites as well; and the unpopular quasi-resolution was
dictated by elites.44
The migration crisis began in 2016 when hundreds of thousands of Syrians
fled the civil war in their homeland, joining a stream of refugees from
elsewhere in the Middle East, who were heading for safety in Europe. After
much dithering, the European governments admitted a huge number of
migrants, straining the administrative and logistical capacities of the member
states, particularly those around the periphery. Many Europeans feared that
the wave of migration would bring terrorism and additional problems of
assimilation, which had long been simmering. This unpopular decision fueled
a European political crisis.45
A major source of tension in both crises was the outsized role of Germany.
With the largest and wealthiest economy, Germany took the lead in
addressing the euro crisis. It therefore received most of the blame for
austerity, which created an enormous amount of suffering in Greece and the
other countries that received loans, while many economists argued that the
policy was self-defeating.46 It was also Germany that took the lead in the
migration crisis, and shouldered most of the responsibility for admitting the
migrants.47 The democratic deficit took on ominous coloring. It was possible
for Europeans to think that they ceded their political autonomy not to a remote
but European bureaucracy, but to Germany.
44. See generally Christopher Alessi & James McBride, The Eurozone in Crisis, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/eurozone-crisis (last updated Feb. 11, 2015)
(discussing the euro crisis).
45. See generally Jeanne Park, Europe’s Migration Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/europes-migration-crisis (last updated Sept. 23, 2015)
(discussing the European migrant crisis).
46. See Daniel Schwartz, Germany Key to Solving European Debt Crisis, CBC NEWS (Aug.
17, 2011, 4:20 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/germany-key-to-solving-european-debtcrisis-1.1014172.
47. See Celestine Bohlen, France Takes a Back Seat to Germany in E.U. Migrant Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/world/europe/france-europemigrant-crisis-germany.html.
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The United Kingdom did not accept as many Syrian refugees as Germany
and other countries did, and it was not directly affected by the euro crisis.48
But the failures in European governance—and the sense that European
governance meant German governance—played a role in Brexit by giving
new force to longstanding Euroscepticism and to fears of excessive
immigration. With the undeniable fact of the democratic deficit, the European
system depended on its reputation for technocratic governance, and the string
of failures suggested that the reputation was undeserved.49
Brexit might have been treated as an unfortunate detour on the way to
fuller European integration. Indeed, integration remains popular throughout
Europe despite the significant loss of trust by the public in European
institutions.50 Just by surviving the euro and migration crises, the EU might
gain strength. Indeed, the two crises have forced member states to cooperate
more closely in banking regulation and border security.
But Brexit implies something more ominous. As Weiler noted, as far back
as the early 1990s exit from the EU was regarded as unthinkable, and the
political impossibility of exit was the premise of his claim of a
“transformation” of European law from Westphalian to constitutional:
The closure of Exit, in my perspective, means that Community
obligations, Community law, and Community policies were “for
real.” Once adopted (the crucial phrase is “once adopted”), Member
States found it difficult to avoid Community obligations. If Exit is
foreclosed, the need for Voice increases.51

Brexit throws the efforts to constitutionalize European law into doubt, and
for this reason has grave political as well as legal implications. If continued
membership is optional, then all member states can continuously bargain for
additional privileges, further eroding the uniformity and strength of European
law. Far from being internalized, as global legalists would have it, European
law is becoming a bargaining chip between nations that are jealous of their
sovereignty. Westphalia has returned.

48. See Stephen Castle, Britain Is Outside Euro Zone but Not Euro Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (June
15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/business/global/britain-is-outside-euro-zonebut-not-euro-crisis.html; Jeanne Park, supra note 45.
49. For a paper showing that popular confidence in international institutions is a function of
their effectiveness, see Lisa Maria Dellmuth & Jonas Tallberg, The Social Legitimacy of
International Organisations: Interest Representation, Institutional Performance, and Confidence
Extrapolation in the United Nations, 41 REV. INT’L STUD. 451 (2015).
50. Frieden, supra note 43, at 27.
51. Weiler, supra note 17, at 2423.
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C. International Law
As in the case of domestic U.S. foreign relations law and European law,
the global legalist agenda was always accompanied by rumblings of
discontent, even at its moment of greatest triumph. For international law, that
moment was the decade of the 1990s. The Cold War had just ended,
apparently confirming the superiority of capitalism and liberal democracy.
The West took the lead in insisting that all countries comply with human
rights (by which was meant liberal or social democracy), using carrots (aid)
and sticks (the threat of military intervention) to encourage countries to
democratize and respect rights. The military interventions in Yugoslavia were
interpreted as democracy-promoting and gave rise to the “responsibility to
protect” slogan, which raised the implicit specter of western-led military
intervention in countries that did not respect the rights of their populations.52
International tribunals were created to prosecute serious human rights
violations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and this effort culminated
in the International Criminal Court of 1999.53 The International Monetary
Fund became a tool for advancing the “Washington consensus”: when
countries experienced debt or currency crises and needed loans, the IMF
would come to the rescue conditional on market-based reforms in the
borrower’s economy.54 The World Bank complemented this effort with “rule
of law” aid projects that sought to liberalize the economies of developing
countries.55 International trade was advanced through the WTO, NAFTA, and
other trade agreements, which swept in an ever greater number of countries,
and made deep inroads against trade barriers.56
The rumblings of discontent took many forms. There was significant, even
violent, opposition to free trade, including the Seattle riots of 1999.57 The
deregulation of international capital flows resulted in currency and sovereign

52. See HUMA HAIDER, GOVERNANCE & SOC. DEV. RES. CTR., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
FRAMEWORKS FOR HUMANITARIAN ACTION 46–49 (2013), http://www.gsdrc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/ILFHA.pdf.
53. POSNER, supra note 5, at 195–99.
54. See Moises Naim, Fads and Fashion in Economic Reforms: Washington Consensus or
Washington
Confusion?,
INT’L
MONETARY
FUND
(Oct.
26,
1999),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/naim.htm.
55. See Justice and Rule of Law, WORLD BANK (Apr. 28, 2015),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/justice-rights-and-public-safety.
56. POSNER, supra note 5, at 30.
57. See
World
Trade Organization
Protests
in Seattle,
SEATTLE.GOV,
https://www.seattle.gov/cityarchives/exhibits-and-education/digital-document-libraries/worldtrade-organization-protests-in-seattle (last visited July 22, 2017).
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debt crises in numerous countries.58 The records of the Yugoslavia and
especially the Rwanda tribunals left much to be desired—the tribunals were
incredibly slow and expensive, and prosecuted very few people.59 The United
States refused to ratify the treaty creating the International Criminal Court.60
Indeed, the notion that global legalism was triumphant was always hard to
reconcile with the position of the United States, which frequently refused to
ratify major treaties, including human rights treaties, and the Law of the Sea
treaty.61
But the turning point was 9/11. Since then, global legalism has stumbled
from one disaster to another. These include: post 9/11 U.S. counterterrorism
policy, including torture, detention, and drone-based assassination, much of
which was in flagrant violation of, or in tension with, the human rights
treaties; the illegal and unsuccessful Iraq War of 2003; the collapse and
reorganization in 2006 of the UN Human Rights Commission, which had
been taken over by human-rights abusing countries; the illegal Russian
military interventions in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine in 2014; the
Eurozone crisis, which began in 2008 and is continuing; the legally
controversial and unsuccessful military intervention in Libya of 2011; the
failure to stop the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria starting in 2011; the
collapse of the Arab Spring in 2012; the migration crisis in Europe, which
began in 2015; the withdrawals from the International Criminal Court by
several African countries in 2016.62 During this period, the WTO process
ground to a halt, thanks to the backlash against international trade and worries
about sovereignty,63 and political freedom around the world retreated for the
first time since World War II.64
58. See Sergio L. Schmukler, Benefits and Risks of Financial Globalization: Challenges for
Developing Countries, 89 FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., May 2004, at 39, 39–41,
https://www.frbatlanta.org/-/media/documents/research/publications/economicreview/2004/vol89no2_schmukler.pdf.
59. POSNER, supra note 5, at 196–97.
60. Id. at 201.
61. For a discussion, see id. at 163.
62. Owen Bowcott, Rising Nationalism Leaves International Criminal Court at Risk,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 29, 2016, 3:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/dec/29/risingnationalism-leaves-international-criminal-court-at-risk?CMP=share_btn_tw.
63. On the resurgence of protectionism (disguised as nontariff barriers), see generally
TRADE
ORG.,
REPORT
ON
G20
TRADE
MEASURES
(2016),
WORLD
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/g20_wto_report_june16_e.pdf; Fredrik Erixon
&
Razeen
Sally,
Protectionism
Is
on
the
Rise,
VOX,
http://voxeu.org/debates/commentaries/protectionism-rise (last visited July 7, 2017).
64. See generally ARCH PUDDINGTON & TYLER ROYLANCE, FREEDOM HOUSE, POPULISTS
AND
AUTOCRATS:
THE
DUAL THREAT TO
GLOBAL DEMOCRACY
(2017),
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FIW_2017_Report_Final.pdf.
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As if none of this was going on, Spiro, writing in 2013, argued that
“international actors have been able to make the United States pay for
perceived human rights violation in the anti-terror context.”65 His only
evidence is the decision by European governments to withdraw permission
from the CIA to operate “black sites” on their territory.66 But refusal to
cooperate with a program is not the same thing as retaliation. The Europeans
and the U.S. government disagree about all kinds of things; the United States
has never dictated the behavior of its allies. No international actor has made
the United States “pay” for torture, assassination, and other human rights
violations. Spiro, like other global legalists, exaggerates the scope of
international legal cooperation by portraying the United States as an outlier,
which alone is powerful enough to break the law and even then is constantly
being reined in at the margins by unidentified “international actors.” On the
contrary, most other countries engage in this behavior themselves, and in any
event, need the United States for counterterrorism help more than the United
States needs them. To all appearances, cooperation continues to flourish.
Indeed, in that respect the story is not entirely bleak. Cooperation on
counterterrorism is one of two bright spots in international cooperation after
9/11, the other being progress toward combatting climate change, albeit in
the weakly institutionalized Paris Agreement that the United States has just
withdrawn from. There have also certainly been specific diplomatic
agreements that benefited the countries involved (like the U.S.-Iran nuclear
agreement), as there always are. International tribunals of various sorts—
mostly regional—continue to decide cases, and the vast bureaucracies in the
UN, World Bank, IMF, and various regional institutions, continue to do their
work. But the tribunals aside, these types of international cooperation are of
the traditional Westphalian type: the momentum toward global legalism is
gone.
We can summarize this backward movement by noting that international
security—as embodied in the UN charter’s prohibitions on use of force—and
human rights are the two most significant pillars of international law since
the end of the Cold War. And both are in shambles. The United States and
Russia have repeatedly violated the use of force prohibition. And human
rights have worsened over the last decade.67 Meanwhile, tribunals and other
international institutions are contributing little to international order, and
there have been no major efforts to advance international legalization for
more than a decade.
65.
66.
67.

Spiro, supra note 7, at 319.
Id.
POSNER, supra note 9, at 49–50.
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Meanwhile, international economic cooperation is also in decline. Here,
we should point out something that most debates about international law
leave out: the persistent unhappiness of major developing countries with what
they regard as their coercive and unfair treatment under the major
international economic institutions—including the austerity policies of the
IMF, and the trade policies of the WTO.68
Combine these events with the populist backlashes within countries and
the overall impression is one of significant backsliding and retrenchment—
something that international law scholars have not, as far as I am aware of,
predicted or even discussed as realistic possibilities. What went wrong? The
simple answer is that the benefits of globalization—greater wealth and
freedom—failed to materialize as promised, with most of the gains going to
a small fragment of the global elite, or to vast populations of workers in places
like China, with cheaper consumer goods in the West failing to compensate
people in their minds for the economic dislocation they experienced.69 Human
freedom has not advanced since 2000, and has very likely declined.
Meanwhile, the costs of globalization turned out to be highly visible. These
costs included the spread of international terrorism, disease (such as the
SARS epidemic in 2002–2003), and economic instability, represented above
all by the financial crisis of 2007–2008, whose causes and effects were global
in nature. As in the 1930s, the natural reaction has been to abandon global
commitments in favor of familiar tribal and national loyalties. But modern
international law, born out of that era, was supposed to prevent a return to it
by binding nations ever more closely together. Why did that not happen?
III.

WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE BACKLASH?

The answer to this question is speculative but clues lie about, and they can
be put together into a suggestive theory. The overwhelming impetus to
backlash lay in popular opinion across countries. Many ordinary people, left
behind by globalization, have united in their opposition to further
international legalization. They have lost faith in international institutions (as
illustrated best by Europe) and in the national leaders who supported them.
They now seek new national leaders who will advance the national interest
rather than global ideals.

68. See MARK BLYTH, AUSTERITY: THE HISTORY OF A DANGEROUS IDEA 215 (2015).
69. See Binyamin Appelbaum, A Little-Noticed Fact About Trade: It’s No Longer Rising,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/31/upshot/a-little-noticed-factabout-trade-its-no-longer-rising.html.
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The backlash should not come as a complete surprise. As we saw, worries
about the democratic deficit in Europe are as old as European integration.
While most scholars supported European integration, either because they
believed that the democratic deficit was mythical, or that the benefits of
integration exceeded any costs to democracy,70 the dissenting view persisted
if only because it was impossible to ignore the evidence.71 Public opinion
surveys showed that many Europeans distrusted European institutions.
European politicians successfully ran on anti-Europe campaign promises.
Voters in some European countries rejected the European constitution and
the Lisbon Treaty. And pro-integration mainstream leaders took the
democratic deficit seriously enough to try to address it by strengthening the
European Parliament. Brexit only ratified a longstanding worry.
In the United States, the debate took place in a lower key. The United
States is not bound by any international institutions whose strength and
authority is comparable to that of the European institutions. Indeed, the
United States has disproportionate influence over most major international
institutions, and nearly always can protect itself with veto rights. However,
from time to time, a relatively minor question of international law erupted
into public consciousness. The possibility that the International Criminal
Court could have jurisdiction over American soldiers provoked Congress to
pass a law in 2002 that appeared to authorize a military invasion of the
Netherlands if an American was ever held for trial.72 Roper and related cases
caused a public outcry, leading some state legislatures to pass statutes that
blocked courts from relying on “foreign law.”73 The American political
system is suspicious of human rights treaties, and the Senate has become
increasingly reluctant to give its consent to any treaty at all—although this is
partly an artifact of a 2/3 majority rule and the disproportionate influence of
rural populations in that body.
The academic debate in the United States also received little attention. In
the 1990s, no one thought in terms of a democratic deficit. The dominant
view was that international law was good, and therefore judges, bureaucrats,
and other officials should use it as much as possible to bind the United

70. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, In Defence of the “Democratic Deficit”: Reassessing
Legitimacy in the European Union, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 603, 621–22 (2002); Weiler, supra
note 17.
71. SCHARPF, supra note 39, at 258.
72. American Service-Members’ Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012).
73. 2015 Foreign Law Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (Oct. 15, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015-legislation-regarding-theapplication-of-foreign-law-in-state-courts.aspx.
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States.74 Yet dissenting views were aired from time to time. In 2003, Robert
Bork argued that incorporation of international law into domestic
constitutional law by the courts violates the “rule of law” by depriving the
people of influence over policy through legislation.75 In 2005, Jeremy Rabkin
argued that this style of “global governance” violated Westphalian
sovereignty as well as democratic principles.76 In a 2007 article, John
McGinnis and Ilya Somin argued that international law lacks a democratic
pedigree because it reflects compromises with foreign states, most of them
authoritarian, and therefore American courts should not incorporate it into
domestic law unless Congress and the president has authorized them to.77 And
in 2012, Julian Ku and John Yoo argued that this style of judicial activism
violated the U.S. Constitution.78
McGinnis and Somin see international law as the work of global elites. 79
They argue that elites across the world create, interpret, and enforce
international law, and that their incentives are not to create international law
that benefits everyone or reflects the values of the global population, but to
create international law that benefits themselves and reflects their own
values.80 However, in allowing that international law should be enforceable
if incorporated by Congress and the president, McGinnis and Somin missed
an important feature of the political landscape. The president and members
of Congress are members of the elites themselves. The populist backlash
against international law encompasses international law with impeccable
democratic credentials like NAFTA and the WTO system, both of which
were incorporated into domestic law by the president and Congress.81

74. SLAUGHTER, supra note 21, at 5; Koh, supra note 26, at 1835. For a recent statement by
a political scientist, see KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS,
POLITICS, RIGHTS 335–66 (2014).
75. ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 15–19 (2003).
76. JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES 16–17 (2005).
77. John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59
STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1204, 1232 (2007).
78. JULIAN KU & JOHN YOO, TAMING GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 2, 10–12 (2012).
79. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 77, at 1238–39. As noted by McGinnis & Somin, this
viewpoint is also espoused by Robert Bork. Id. at 1177 n.4 (citing BORK, supra note 75); see also
RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004). For a defense of international law that argues that it protects
minorities, akin to John Hart Ely’s theory of judicial review, see Anupam Chander, Globalization
and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193 (2005).
80. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 77, at 1238–39.
81. BRADLEY, supra note 23, at 82.
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Still, in their normative argument we see a germ of a positive theory of
international backlash. Any type of international cooperation involves
centralization. A greater distance is opened up between the ordinary people
and the decisionmakers with effective power. As centralization occurs, more
valuable public goods can be created, but agency costs increase as well. Since
ordinary people cannot observe whether the decisionmakers act for the public
interest, they can only accept on faith the assurances of their national leaders.
When people’s ordinary experience contradicts the assurances of those
leaders, they lose faith in them. This is what happened as a result of the
financial crisis and the ensuing global recession—especially as ordinary
people learned that only the very wealthy in western countries have benefited
from globalization, while most people have been harmed or unaffected.82 This
last fact seems to confirm the suspicion that global and national
decisionmakers act in the interests of the elites, not of the ordinary people.
While this idea is a simplification, it has enough basis in fact to produce
significant political resonance, igniting the global populist backlash.
Thus, in Europe and the United States, international institutions have
provided a convenient target for populists, as have the national leaders who
have supported them. The populists have been able to blame globalization
and international law for insecurity and economic dislocation as a way to
undermine the establishment elites who constructed them. The populists can
make a powerful argument, supported by scholarly research, that the
international institutions—or the process of globalization they have
facilitated—have benefited the elites while leaving behind ordinary people.83
While Europe does not have a history of populism in the way that the
United States does, the anti-European parties—UKIP in Britain, Law and
Justice in Poland, the People’s Party in Denmark, the National Front in
France, Syriza in Greece, and many others—bear the hallmarks of populism.
They claim (not always wrongly) that problems in their countries are due to
corruption at high levels of government, caused by an establishment
consisting of cosmopolitan elites, who disregard the well-being of ordinary
people. The right-wing populists are nationalist, and either endorse or flirt
with racist and xenophobic positions, while left-wing populists like Syriza
82. See, e.g., Chrystia Freeland, The Rise of the New Global Elite, ATLANTIC, Jan.–Feb.
2011, at 44, 44–47, 54, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/01/the-rise-of-thenew-global-elite/308343/; Nina Pavcnik, How Has Globalization Benefited the Poor?, YALE
INSIGHTS (Apr. 28, 2009), http://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/how-has-globalization-benefitedthe-poor (“[I]nequality between the more educated and less educated has increased. The extent of
the increase varies somewhat from country to country, but the evidence suggests that the more
educated are benefiting more from the trade reforms than the less educated.”).
83. See Pavcnik, supra note 82.
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seek wealth redistribution. Like populists throughout history, they make
promises they can’t keep, or vague promises that mean little, and use
sometimes violent or vulgar language that appeals to the crowd and burnishes
their anti-establishment credentials. And they draw support from less
educated people who feel left behind and vulnerable to the influx of workers
and immigrants, and the threats of terrorism and economic dislocation.84
In the United States, Donald Trump rode to victory on his antiinternationalism as well. He attacked international institutions, including the
UN, the WTO, and NATO; repudiated America’s longstanding commitment
to free trade; and advocated a nationalistic, isolationist position, while
blaming the elites on left and right for failing to defend American interests.
He attacked international treaties, human rights, and the laws of war. His antielitism, along with his anti-immigrant stance, marked him out as a populist
like the European leaders.85
What does the populist backlash mean for the theory that people have
“internalized” international law? There was never much evidence for this
view,86 but if it is correct, then some mechanism must explain why people
who have internalized international law might come to reject it. One
possibility is that internationalization is just a form of deference to authority.
People internalize international law just to the extent that they defer to the
views of government officials who support it. When divisions open up among
political leaders, this deference ceases. Another possibility is that
internalization occurs only as long as people are satisfied with their level of
well-being and attribute it to international law. When economic dislocation
84. See JUDIS, supra note 3, at 75, 135, 139; MÜLLER, supra note 3, at 12.
85. David Bosco, We’ve Been Here Before: The Durability of Multilateralism, 70 J. INT’L
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Nationalistic
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(Nov.
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2006)
(unpublished
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udes%20towards%20the%20United%20Nations.pdf;
United
Nations,
GALLUP,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/116347/united-nations.aspx (last visited July 22, 2017). The World
Values Survey [WVS] also shows no clear trend in support for international law or institutions.
See WORLD VALUES SURVEY ASSOCIATION [WVSA], WVS WAVE 3 (1995–1998) (2015),
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV3.jsp
[https://archive.org/details/
WorldValuesSurvey1995-1998Volume3]; WVSA, WVS WAVE 4 (1999–2004) (2015),
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV4.jsp
[https://archive.org/details/
WorldValuesSurvey19992004Volume4]; WVSA, WVS WAVE 5 (2005–2009) (2015),
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strikes, people are liable to blame all sources of authority. Both of these
views, however, suggest that internalization was never the right word to begin
with. People see international law in instrumental terms, and support it when
it seems to benefit them. When globalization and international legal
integration coincided with economic growth, people supported it; now they
do not.
CONCLUSION
Globalization is not looking so inevitable these days. Historical
perspective explains why global legalists should not have displayed so much
confidence in their predictions. As is well known, an earlier globalization
took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It ended with
World War I, which ushered in a period of isolation and nationalism that
persisted until the end of World War II. One can identify still earlier periods
of globalization cycles: the Roman empire followed by its fragmentation in
the second half of the first millennium; the high middle ages, unified (in
Europe) under the Church, followed by the Reformation and the religious
wars; and then the age of empires, which was deeply shaken by nationalist
movements in the nineteenth century, though collapse of most of the empires
did not occur until the twentieth. In all these cases, globalization is a process
by which political power is centralized at a high level—in a city, a nation, or
a group of nations, which set and enforce policy for a much larger area.
Globalization halts and collapses when the center loses this power. We see,
in other words, periods of centralization and periods of decentralization over
the world or large areas of it, just as we see periods of centralization and
decentralization within countries and at even lower levels of administration.
Only history will tell, but the current period, starting in 2001, seems to be (so
far) a gradual period of slowing centralization, which may or may not
eventually unwind. If we must look for a pattern, the pattern we find is
cyclical rather than linear.
What could account for this cycle? Pressure for centralization arises
because of the gains from public goods being generated at an ever larger
scale. This pressure always exists, but the right circumstances—
technological, political, demographic—are needed to channel it into greater
international cooperation. During the great periods of centralization, trade,
investment, and migration flourish, generating wealth. All of these activities
require order, and order is best kept by a hegemon (like Rome, or Imperial
Britain for the high seas), or by cooperation among a small number of major
powers. The problem is that whatever empire, nation, or group keeps order
also can use its power to channel most of the benefits of order to itself—either
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by choosing rules that benefit it, or by demanding tribute. When these
transfers become too large—or are simply perceived as being too large—
resentments build, and so do the pressures for decentralization, which may
also be assisted by technological change that favors local autonomy rather
than centralization. People demand autonomy for smaller-scale groups whose
leaders they can trust. When the centers of power resist, wars may result. But
the centers may peacefully accommodate the demand for decentralization as
well.
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the reaction to centralization
took the form of nationalist movements, which were often popular in
character and yet were not always populist because they were so frequently
led by, or exploited by, kings, princes, and other government officials. The
modern style of reaction is more populist in character because of its emphasis
on the malign influence of technocratic elites who may be co-nationals but
are thought to be more loyal to foreigners or to themselves than to the public.

